CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HEARS STATEMENTS FROM SEVEN DIGNITARIES ON DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

The Conference on Disarmament today heard general policy statements on disarmament and non-proliferation from dignitaries from Colombia, Latvia, Iran, Japan, Poland, Viet Nam, and Italy. It also heard a statement from Austria, mainly focusing on cluster munitions, and a right of reply from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Six Party Talks.

Francisco Santos Calderón, Vice President of Colombia, said that in Colombia illegal armed groups used terrorist practices to threaten the security of citizens and had taken thousands of victims. Those groups had unlimited access to all the arms they wished, financed by the illicit drug trade. Thus, for Colombia it was imperative that the Conference on Disarmament turned from rhetoric to action aimed at the effective establishment of legally binding instruments to prevent arms from falling into the hands of terrorists. It was unthinkable what such groups could do if they had weapons of mass destruction or radiological bombs at their disposal.

Artis Pabriks, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, said that Latvia regretted the unsuccessful attempt to conclude an agreement on mines other than anti-personnel mines during the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). While acknowledging the potential positive effect of the initiative on cluster munitions taken by Norway and 46 other nations, Latvia considered the CCW to be the most appropriate forum for addressing that issue.

Manouchehr Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, said it was surprising that while no practical steps were taken to contain the real source of nuclear danger in the Middle East, Iran was under tremendous pressure to renounce its inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran was of the belief that the issue could be resolved through negotiations without any preconditions and wished to seize this opportunity to show its readiness to resolve this issue. Iran underscored that if the Five Plus One Countries referred back Iran's nuclear issue from the Security Council to the International Atomic Energy Agency, it would be prepared to offer the necessary guarantees in order to create confidence regarding the non-diversion of its nuclear programme.

Masayoshi Hamada, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, said that the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was critical. In that connection, Japan reiterated its condemnation of the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and emphasized that a nuclear-armed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not be tolerated. Although the agreement at the Six Party Talks in February marked progress, efforts for the full implementation of the Joint Statement in September 2005 should be continued.

Anna Fotyga, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland said, that while many existing multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks had been created in qualitatively different conditions, Poland believed that they retained their relevance in the contemporary world. Indeed, seeking ways to ensure that existing structures stood up to modern security demands was the most important task before them today. In addition, without a fissile material treaty, the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture remained incomplete and could not be fully operable or effective. Poland therefore hoped that the Conference could soon reach agreement on the start of negotiations on a fissile material treaty, without setting any preliminary parameters, conditions or restraints.

Pham Binh Minh, Assistant Foreign Minister of Viet Nam, said the fact that nuclear arsenals continued to be modernized, that the threshold of nuclear weapon use had been lowered, and that force was more readily used in international relations was part of the dynamic leading to the desire to acquire nuclear weapons, and thus engendered new complications in the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, in parallel with the risk of those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Countries with nuclear capability had to assume their responsibilities with regard to international peace and security, and they should redouble their efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

Vittorio Craxi, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, said that Italy felt that the best way to proceed towards the objective of disarmament and non-proliferation was to immediately commence negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The non-nuclear weapon States had to be the first to take the initiative to elaborate a process which, certainly, would not resolve all nuclear problems, but which would establish a limit on stocks of fissile materials and thus prevent a new nuclear spiral. The nuclear weapon States had already expressed their readiness to begin such negotiations. Therefore, there were no more reasons, and no more excuses, to delay a start to negotiations.

On the issue of cluster munitions, the Representative of Austria announced that during a recent meeting in Oslo, Austria had declared a national moratorium on the use of cluster bombs and cluster munitions until the elaboration of an adequate international regulation. Additionally, the Council of Ministers had decided to uphold the comprehensive moratorium even if a future international convention should fail to achieve a far-reaching solution. As another contribution to the establishment of a legally binding instrument on cluster munitions, Austria had declared its readiness to organize a follow-up conference to the Oslo meeting, which in all likelihood would take place in Vienna in early December this year.

Speaking in a right of reply, the Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, responding to comments made by Japan, noted that the implementation of the Six Party Talks was the responsibility of all involved, and that if one party wished to pursue its own egocentric path, it would jeopardize the negotiations as a whole. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea would not tolerate such a stance.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 14 March, at 3 p.m., when the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea will address the Conference.

Statements

FRANCISCO SANTOS CALDERÓN, Vice President of Colombia, observed that terrorism knew no borders, and therefore it was necessary to work together to fight it. In Colombia, illegal armed groups used terrorist practices to threaten the security of citizens and had taken thousands of victims. Those groups had unlimited access to all the arms they wished, financed by the illicit drug trade. Thus, for Colombia it was imperative that the Conference on Disarmament turned from rhetoric to action aimed at the effective establishment of legally binding instruments to prevent arms from falling into the hands of terrorists. It was unthinkable what such groups could do if they had weapons of mass destruction or radiological bombs at their disposal. Thus, in addition to its international commitments in this field, Colombia continued to work internally to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including being a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia was convinced of the need to work together to
continue negotiations for a multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty. For that reason Colombia had worked for the reactivation of the Conference within the framework of the Five Ambassadors proposal, of which it was a co-author, as a possible solution to break the deadlock in this forum.

A theme of particular interest for Colombia was the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons. Despite the precarious results achieved in the Review Conference of July 2006, the future of the Programme of Action on Small Arms was intimately linked to the political will of States to combat that mortal traffic and the capacity for action of civil society. Colombia had been very involved in the fight against traffic in small arms and light weapons and had participated in national and local debates in which national and local institutions and civil society had participated. Recently, President Uribe had declared 2007 to be the Year of Life in Colombia. Under that initiative different proposals had been formulated to advance campaigns aimed at disarmament. Anti-personnel mines, which had been used as one of the principal strategies of war by illegal armed groups, were another concern. The Government had developed a number of strategies to deal with that scourge since 2004, including programmes aimed at the socio-economic reintegration of victims in society and developing a rehabilitation plan for military staff victims of mines. Moreover, the Government continued to fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention prohibiting the use of anti-personnel mines, and in October 2004 had successfully completed the destruction of its own stockpiles. Colombia called on armed groups to immediately abandon their practice of using anti-personnel mines on humanitarian grounds.

ARTIS PABRIKS, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, said that Latvia believed that the valuable initiative of the Six Presidents Initiative of the past year, along with a much more engaging approach proposed by the current sextet, should generate the sufficient momentum to start the long awaited negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Latvia regretted that several important disarmament forums had not produced the desired results, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the Small Arms and Light Weapons Review Conference, to name a few. In particular, Latvia regretted the unsuccessful attempt to conclude an agreement on mines other than anti-personnel mines during the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and hoped that the Convention would live up to the expectations of its States parties to start negotiations on a legally binding instrument to regulate the technical design and characteristics of cluster munitions with a view to minimizing their humanitarian impact. While acknowledging the potential positive effect of the initiative on cluster munitions taken by Norway and 46 other nations, Latvia considered the CCW to be the most appropriate forum for addressing that issue.

Proliferation of military technologies, arms, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as their means of delivery was still one of the greatest challenges today. It was compounded by the dual usability of many of today's technologies. All too often a thin line marked the difference between peaceful and military use of technologies. In the light of the rise of extremism and terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction took on a whole new meaning and urgency. That was why Latvia saw discussions within the Conference on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) as of paramount importance. Latvia believed that the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT were long overdue and called on the Member States of the Conference not to wait any longer. Latvia itself had actively pursued non-proliferation policies, including stringent export controls regarding weapons of mass destruction and dual-use materials. In conclusion, Latvia wished to remind the Conference of the long line outside its doors. Since 1982, 24 non-member States had applied for membership, including Latvia. Observership was nice, but it was not sufficient, and Latvia hoped that the Conference would decide to increase its membership in the near future.

MANOUCHEHR MOTTAKI, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, said that the existence of an estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads in nuclear weapon States' stockpiles was a threat to the whole of humanity that could not be overlooked. Moreover, the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the failure of certain nuclear weapon States to fulfil their international obligations continued to threaten the international community. It was worth
mentioning that the only country that had ever used nuclear weapons still maintained a sizeable arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads, of which many were operational and on a hair-trigger alert. Deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in several European countries and the construction of new facilities for the production of new nuclear warheads, in particular easy-to-use nuclear weapons (Mini Nukes), were in clear contravention of the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, transferring nuclear technology and materials to non-members of the NPT, whose nuclear facilities were operating outside the full scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and monitoring, contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and would certainly weaken and undermine the credibility and integrity of the non-proliferation regime. It was now more urgent than ever to redouble efforts towards the goal of creating a nuclear-weapon-free world. The misuse of the non-proliferation principle as a political tool could in no way lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The recent military intervention by the United States against Iraq was clear evidence of the failure of such a policy. The basic argument for the attack on Iraq had been to combat weapons of mass destruction and to bring more security to the region. However, after years of searching, it was obvious that the preparation of such an attack had been based on false and forged information. On the other hand, one could easily judge whether there was more or less security in the region as a result.

Despite the total failure of the previous NPT Review Conference, due to the disregard of the above-mentioned commitments and the unilateral approach adopted by some, Iran hoped that the first Preparatory Committee for the Seventh NPT Review Conference would take practical steps for paving the way for a successful Review Conference. Iran was a consistent and fervent advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as evidenced by its proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which it had vigorously pursued. However, the Zionist regime continued to refuse to accede to the NPT and had rejected the IAEA safeguards regime. Regrettably, after the Zionist regime's admission that it possessed nuclear weapons, instead of condemning that acknowledgement and taking measures against it, the members of the European Union had lifted the 10-year-old sanctions against investments by European banks in that regime's projects. In that connection, it was surprising that while no practical steps were taken to contain the real source of nuclear danger in the Middle East, Iran was under tremendous pressure to renounce its inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, under the NPT. Iran was committed to a negotiated solution and was of the belief that the issue could be resolved through negotiations without any preconditions, as the Non-Aligned Movement Heads of State and Government had emphasized in their special statement at the Summit in Havana. Iran wished to seize this opportunity to show its readiness to resolve this issue, underscoring that if the Five Plus One Countries referred back Iran's nuclear issue from the Security Council to the IAEA, Iran would be prepared to offer the necessary guarantees in order to create confidence regarding the non-diversion of its nuclear programme.

MASAYOSHI HAMADA, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, wished to take note of the disarmament and non-proliferation efforts that were utilizing the United Nations and regional frameworks. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was one of the important frameworks for international peace and security. Although the NPT was currently facing a number of serious crises, there was no substitute for it and their mission was to maintain and strengthen the Treaty. It had been reassuring, therefore, that during the NPT seminar hosted by Japan in February this year, the importance of maintaining the reliability of the NPT had been unanimously recognized. As the Chair-designate for the first NPT Preparatory Committee to be held in April and May this year, Japan intended to energetically carry out its role as president in order to accomplish constructive discussions for the maintenance and strengthening of the NPT. It was imperative that the Member States of the Conference on Disarmament expended greater efforts to begin negotiations on a disarmament treaty. Furthermore, negotiations could be commenced on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which all countries, including nuclear weapon States, had agreed was ripe for negotiation. The Conference had to restore its primary role by taking the pragmatic approach of agreeing to that which could be agreed upon. From the twin perspectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such a treaty would be an important milestone.

Japan was convinced that the Conference on Disarmament should continue deepening its deliberation on other agenda items – nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances – and Japan was prepared to actively participate in discussions on any of those items. In relation to nuclear disarmament, in addition to an FMCT, the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was critical. In that connection, Japan reiterated its condemnation of the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and emphasized that a nuclear-armed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not be tolerated. Although the agreement at the Six Party Talks in February marked progress, efforts for the full implementation of the Joint Statement in September 2005 should be continued. The Fifth Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT would be held in September this year, and Japan aimed to heighten the momentum towards its prompt entry into force in the lead up to and within that Conference.

ANNA FOTYGA, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, believed that they were approaching the critical phase of evaluating the progress of work in the Conference on Disarmament. This was the time when they should give some consideration to ideas which could bring them closer to the ultimate goal of rebirth of negotiations within the Conference. Poland's determination to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture stemmed from an assessment of new security challenges. In a world increasingly endangered by new phenomena such as terrorism, proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, or the growing capabilities of non-State actors to attack States, to name just a few, States could not manage security unilaterally. The nature of such phenomena imposed the need for an integral and comprehensive approach to security. One could argue that the many multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks had been created in qualitatively different conditions and had thus become obsolete as new development and new challenges had emerged. However, Poland believed that they retained their relevance in the contemporary world. The shortcoming lay in their insufficient flexibility. Indeed, seeking ways to ensure that existing structures stood up to modern security demands was the most important task before them today.

Poland saw the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a unique instrument and the true cornerstone of global security. It was a vital tool in multilateral endeavours towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Hence, its effectiveness directly affected global peace and security. In light of the emerging security threats and challenges, the credibility of the NPT would strongly depend upon its universal nature and integral character. Strengthening the NPT regime would require finding possibilities for its full globalization and enhancing the means of implementation of its provisions. The review of the NPT process in the coming years should also address the question of full recognition of the States' right to the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, while diminishing the acute risks of proliferation. Poland had already started its active involvement in the coming review cycle with a view towards achieving those goals during the 2010 Review Conference. Other valuable instruments included the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In that connection, like the CWC, the BWC should be strengthened by developing a verification mechanism. Finally, negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) were a priority. Without an FMCT, the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture remained incomplete and therefore could not be fully operable or effective. Poland hoped that the Conference could soon reach agreement on the start of negotiations on an FMCT, without setting any preliminary parameters, conditions or restraints.

PHAM BINH MINH, Assistant Foreign Minister of Viet Nam, observed that, over the past decades, a number of important international legal instruments on disarmament had been created to deal with different categories of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, and to promote disarmament at both the global and regional levels. However, the present process of disarmament caused serious concerns. There was a danger of the arms race being accelerated with the introduction of new types of modern lethal weapons on the ground, in the air, at sea and possibly in outer space. The topic of disarmament had been omitted in the Declaration of the 2005 United Nations Summit; the last Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference had failed to come to agree on a substantive
final document; and the United Nations disarmament forums remained in a state of deadlock. The fact that nuclear arsenals continued to be modernized, that the threshold of nuclear weapon use had been lowered, and that force was more readily used in international relations was part of the dynamic leading to the desire to acquire nuclear weapons, and thus engendered new complications in the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, in parallel with the risk of those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Countries with nuclear capability had to assume their responsibilities with regard to international peace and security, and should redouble their efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

It was the consistent policy of Viet Nam to support and promote comprehensive and complete disarmament with top priority given to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Viet Nam supported the non-proliferation and reduction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction with the ultimate aim of their total elimination. Pursuant to that policy, Viet Nam had acceded to all the important international disarmament treaties and strictly complied with them. Viet Nam had also joined the 1995 Treaty on a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, had been among the first signatories to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and, in November 2006, the President of Viet Nam had decided that Viet Nam would sign the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Viet Nam had also fulfilled its obligations arising from Security Council resolutions on combating international terrorism and on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

VITTORIO CRAXI, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, recalled that the Conference on Disarmament had negotiated the majority of major treaties in the disarmament field that had been concluded in the post war period, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and conventions in the area of chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, if nuclear weapons explosions were now the exception, that was thanks to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which had also been negotiated within the framework of the Conference. Regrettably, for 10 years now the Conference had not undertaken any genuine negotiations. Momentum had been building over the past three years, however, with a number of activities and initiatives undertaken with a view to restarting negotiations. Thus, last year it had been possible to carry out structured, focused negotiations and "friends of the Presidents" had been appointed. A further step had been taken this year in the appointment of seven Coordinators for the seven items of the Conference's agenda. The progress had been such that the time had now come to enter into a new phase, the phase of negotiations themselves, and the identification of themes that were ripe.

Italy gave priority to nuclear issues, and had recently reiterated its commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation in the context of a recent trip to Hiroshima by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. Italy felt that the best way to proceed towards that objective was to immediately commence negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). The non-nuclear weapon States had to be the first to take the initiative to elaborate a process which, certainly, would not resolve all nuclear problems, but which would establish a limit on stocks of fissile materials and thus prevent a new nuclear spiral. The nuclear weapon States had already expressed their readiness to begin such negotiations. Therefore, there were no more reasons, and no more excuses, to delay a start to negotiations. Italy recognized that there were other priorities in the Conference, such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. While awaiting the proposal of more concrete projects in that regard, Italy supported the idea of discussing a code of conduct for outer space.

WOLFGANG PETRITSCH (Austria) said that the Ottawa Process that had finally led to the Mine Ban Treaty had started 10 years ago. Today, the Mine Ban Treaty counted 153 States parties, including the majority of those States that were most heavily affected by landmines, such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apart from its progress in terms of universal accession, the Convention had established international standards which were also respected by the majority of those States that had not yet joined. The use of anti-personnel mines had thus been markedly reduced in recent years, fewer mines were being produced and trade in that hazardous weapon had almost
completely ceased. In addition, States parties to the Convention had destroyed stockpiles of mines and cleared vast tracks of mined land. The Convention was unique as it was the first disarmament treaty that addressed the needs of survivors. Austria attached special importance to victim assistance, and on 12 February 2007 had organized an event to highlight this topic, including a symposium entitled "Assisting Landmine Survivors: A Decade of Efforts", which summarized the lessons learned and identified remaining challenges as well as possible solutions to them.

Turning to the issue of cluster munitions, Austria had announced during a recent meeting in Oslo a national moratorium on the use of cluster bombs and cluster munitions until the elaboration of an adequate international regulation. Additionally, the Council of Ministers had decided to uphold the comprehensive moratorium even if a future international convention should fail to achieve a far-reaching solution. As another contribution to the establishment of a legally binding instrument on cluster munitions, Austria had declared its readiness to organize a follow-up conference to the Oslo meeting, which in all likelihood would take place in Vienna in early December this year.

Right of Reply

AN MYONG HUN (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), responding to the statement by Japan, said that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was deeply concerned by the policy of the present Japanese Government which scattered dark clouds over the promising vision of peace and security of South Asia. That policy could never be tolerated. Implementation of the agreement made at the Six Party Talks was the responsibility of all involved. If one party pursued its own egocentric path for its own purposes, it jeopardized the negotiations as a whole. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was witnessing the beginnings of such a move and wished to underscore once again that such a move could not be tolerated.