CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HEARS STATEMENTS FROM 17 STATES ON PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The Conference on Disarmament today heard statements from 17 countries, mainly focusing on the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as on negative security assurances.

Several speakers expressed their concern over the anti-satellite test undertaken by China on 11 January, and its possible impact on space assets of other countries. China reiterated its position that its test had not been targeted against any country, and had not constituted a threat to any country. The United States observed that the system that was tested by China on 11 January had not been based in space, but had been launched from the ground. Prevention of an arms race in outer space, as they had usually discussed it in the Conference, would therefore not ban such a weapon.

Pakistan emphasized that the existing multilateral agreements on prevention of an arms race in outer space did not fully address the gravity of the issue, and did not take into account advances that had taken place. Many speakers agreed that there was a need for a new legal instrument to fill those gaps. As Russia neatly put it, if they did not take action now "recent developments suggested they would have to prohibit an arms race in outer space instead of preventing it". The Republic of Korea held that, in the current climate, confidence-building was needed before proceeding to negotiate a new instrument, and suggested that they might need to start by seeking ways to promote universal adherence to and ensure full compliance with existing agreements and arrangements. However, negotiating new multilateral agreements was "unnecessary and counterproductive" in the view of the United States. Several delegations also voiced concern over the risk posed to space activities by space debris.

Regarding negative security assurances, a number of speakers echoed Egypt's call for the adoption of a multilateral and legally binding instrument to provide non-nuclear weapon States with such comprehensive assurances.

India also spoke on the issue of nuclear disarmament and the need for a nuclear-weapon-free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Speaking this morning (aside from those previously mentioned) were Germany (on behalf of the European Union), Israel, New Zealand, India, Myanmar, Syria, Japan, Australia, Canada, Mexico (on behalf of the Latin American members of the Conference), and Iran.

The next plenary of the Conference, which will be under the Presidency of Spain, will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday 28 February.

Statements

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) speaking on behalf of the European Union, recalled that the European Union had unanimously voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and on prevention of an arms race in outer space in the sixty-first General Assembly. The risk represented by space debris for the operability of space activities was an additional source for concern. From that point of view, some form of interaction between the work in the Conference and that of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was desirable, and the European Union suggested the Conference consider the possibility of inviting the Chairman of the Committee to brief them on questions relevant to their work. The European Union stood ready to explore in a substantial manner the possibilities of preventing an arms race in outer space. The recent test of an anti-satellite weapons should serve as a wake up call in that regard and remind them of the urgency of the matter and their responsibility to act. More than ever a sense of proportion and a sense of responsibility were called for. A gradual and progressive approach was possible. The adoption of measures of transparency and confidence-building, as conducive towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space, could be discussed. Confidence-building measures could, among others, be based on the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive activities in space and drawing up a "code of conduct" and "rules of behaviour" or "rules of the road" in space.

DONG-HEE CHANG (Republic of Korea) said that all nations, both space-faring and non-space-faring had a vital stake and responsibility in ensuring that space remained a common heritage for all. However, radio-frequency spectra were almost saturated and useful orbital positions were densely crowded. Satellites and spacecraft were increasingly jeopardized by space debris and could potentially be targeted by weapons. The Republic of Korea was of the view that space security, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space, was a relevant issue to be dealt with by the Conference. Moreover, the artificial barriers between civil and military activities in space were already dissolving. In that sense, the Republic of Korea looked forward to seeing enhanced dialogue between the Conference on Disarmament and other international forums, including the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly and the International Telecommunication Union.

The Republic of Korea believed they might need to start by seeking ways to promote universal adherence to and ensure full compliance with existing agreements and arrangements, such as the Registration Convention and the Hague Code of Conduct by space-faring nations. Other measures of transparency and confidence-building, which were complementary to current mechanisms and conducive to enhancing space security, could then fruitfully be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament.

VALERY LOSHCHININ (Russian Federation) drew attention to the speech by President Putin on 10 February 2007 in which he had observed that the militarization of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. Security in outer space had to be guaranteed. The Conference on Disarmament had to prove that that could be achieved through multilateral agreement, taking into account legitimate interests of all states and through covering the well known lacunae in the international outer space law. In Russia's view, today was the time to proceed from words to action. Otherwise, as recent developments suggested, they would have to prohibit an arms race in outer space instead of preventing it.

In their forthcoming endeavours on prevention of an arms race in outer space, Russia proposed to concentrate on a single issue, the idea of working out a new treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Elements of such a treaty had been proposed by Russia and China along with a group of co-sponsors in June 2002. Therefore, Russia, along with their Chinese colleagues, were glad to present today the third, revised and amended version of the "Compilation of Comments and Suggestions to the Conference on Disarmament PAROS Working Paper (CD/1679)", which reviewed all the ideas which had been expressed so far in the course of discussions.

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) speaking on behalf of the European Union on the issue of negative security assurances, said that the European Union had already made clear the European Union Common Position of 25 April 2005 on the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, that the European Union was supportive of pursuing consideration of the issue of security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT. As stated in the European Union Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adopted in 2003, positive and negative security assurances could play an important role: they could serve both as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and as a deterrent. The European Union continued to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States, and particularly called on all States in the Middle East to make that region into an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, in keeping with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. It also reiterated its commitment to a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Finally, the European Union called on all nuclear weapon States to reaffirm, in the appropriate forums, existing security assurances noted by the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

ITZHAK LEVANON (Israel) said that the Conference on Disarmament was still entangled in attempts to address long-term objectives without giving due consideration to more realistic short-term objectives aimed at discerning the most urgent and imminent threats to international security and stability. In Israel's view, there were two fundamental threats to peace and security that deserved to be placed as the highest priorities of the Conference: the threat of terrorism in all its dimensions, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. This year, the risks to international peace and stability due to those two threats had reached unprecedented levels. Recently, the issue of arms transfers to terrorists had taken on even more of a critically strategic nature in view of the quality, quantity and sophistication of the arms that continued to flow to terrorists. But terrorist organizations were not operating in a vacuum – they were supported by States, as had been well demonstrated in the case of the active support given to Syria to the Hezbollah. Israel believed that the Conference on Disarmament was an appropriate medium to deal with that issue and to provide a platform for future international arrangements to prevent arms proliferation to terrorists.

During the general debate a few delegations had raised their desire to discuss the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel supported the eventual establishment of such a zone, as had been demonstrated by their joining the consensus resolution in the First Committee under the same title. Yet, Israel was also realistic enough to know that the Middle East could not be advanced out of context. A nuclear-weapon-free zone could only emerge as the outgrowth of a fundamental transformation of the regional political-strategic climate through a gradual process of building trust and reconciliation, followed by more modest arms control measures. Regrettably, such a transformation had thus far eluded the Middle East as it was undermined by the actions and policies of other States in the region.

CHARLOTTE DARLOW (New Zealand) said that preventing the weaponization of outer space was fundamental to safeguarding their ability to access space resources, both now and in the future. Preservation of a weapon-free outer space was rightly a core issue for this Conference. They must ensure that future opportunities for peaceful development were not comprised by militarization. In that regard, New Zealand was concerned to learn that China had undertaken an anti-satellite test with no advance notification – the first such test in 20 years. They were disappointed that security and confidence-building measures did not appear to have been observed. New Zealand remained strongly opposed to any attempts to militarize outer space. The Conference should evaluate prospects for a more comprehensive legal framework regulating the demilitarization of space. Canada had distributed a useful working paper during last year's debate which aimed to identify gaps in the existing legal systems. That might provide a good starting point from which to explore whether there was agreement on the existing gaps before proceeding to debate how best to fill them.

JAYANT PRASAD (India) said that, while maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, India continued to be committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. India's responsible nuclear doctrine was based on no first use and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. That doctrine also reaffirmed India's readiness to join multilateral negotiations for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. India had continued to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive tests. They were also ready to participate in negotiations in the Conference on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

India had spelled out its specific proposals to build consensus towards nuclear disarmament in a non-paper presented to the Conference. In order to facilitate further consideration of practical steps for the progressive and systematic efforts to attain the cessation of a nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, India was separately submitting a working paper on nuclear disarmament to the Conference Secretariat which it had presented to the First Committee on 6 October 2006.

TEHMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) said that the growing dependence of the international community on outer space, as well as its immense potential for communications technologies and their impact on communities around the globe, showed that the peaceful use of outer space was in the interest of all mankind. Concerns about the weaponization of outer space were growing, however, and the consequences if they failed to prevent weaponization in outer space were immense. The Conference on Disarmament was the sole negotiating disarmament forum and had the duty to address this issue. The multilateral agreements in place did not fully address the gravity of the issue, and did not fully take into account advances that had taken place. There was a need for a new legal instrument to fill those gaps. Pakistan thanked China and Russia for the working paper compiling the discussion on this issue in the Conference. Indeed, the documentation available on the issue was impressive; there was sufficient material to commence negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. Finally, she recalled that General Assembly resolution 61/58 once again called on the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee to draft a multilateral treaty to prevent of an arms race in outer space. Pakistan's wish was that the Conference begin work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all earnestness.

SAMEH SHOUKRY (EGYPT) reaffirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. Although the current regime applicable to outer space played an important role in that environment, there was nevertheless a need to consolidate and reinforce that legal regime and enhance its effectiveness, as it did not fully guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its weaponization. Consequently, Egypt believed that negotiations for the conclusion of an international, comprehensive, and legally binding agreement that tackled the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space remained an essential objective. Egypt called on all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to exhibit greater transparency in their outer space activities so as to positively contribute to the overall objective of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes and preventing an arms race.

U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN (Myanmar) said that Myanmar was an ardent supporter of nuclear disarmament and it fully aligned itself with the chapter on disarmament and international security contained in the final document of the XIV Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana last September. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against a nuclear disaster. In that connection, Myanmar called on the Conference to establish an ad hoc Committee to negotiate a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. While it recognized the importance of bilateral negotiations among the nuclear weapon States, Myanmar believed that the Conference should commence multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament at an early date, and asked the Conference to revisit the proposal made by the G-21 in that regard.

Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference should, inter alia, pursue efforts towards concluding a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States; encourage nations to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to adhere strictly to it; work towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals of nuclear weapon States by the full implementation of the 13 steps; and increase efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

HUSSEIN ALI (Syria) observed that Syria was one of co-sponsors of the Chinese and Russian working paper (CD/1679) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including the use of force or threat of use of force against space objects. In Syria's view, establishing an ad hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament was the minimum they should seek to achieve in that regard. Regarding negative security assurances, Syria reaffirmed its belief that achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a moral and political obligation for all States, in particular nuclear weapon States. The best guarantee of the non-use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The continued possession of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon States also posed a threat to the international security regime. Until nuclear weapons were totally eliminated, however, the commencement of negotiations on negative security assurances was a right for all non-nuclear weapon States and an obligation on nuclear weapon States, and the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the Conference was needed.

Syria wished to point out the unprecedented bravery of Israel today in speaking of terrorism in the Conference. Israel was the number one terrorist in the region. Israel had not left one crime undone in Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territories and Syria. They all knew what had happened last summer in Lebanon, when Israel had used 4 million cluster bombs. Every citizen in Lebanon received more than one such bomb. Syria left members to conclude who exercised terrorism and who needed to be called to account for using illegal weapons.

SAMEH SHOUKRY (Egypt), speaking on the issue of negative security assurances, said that Egypt was convinced that the best negative security assurance for non-nuclear weapon States was complete nuclear disarmament. By achieving nuclear disarmament they would effectively erase the necessity for providing such assurances. Unfortunately, the reality today was that the weapons continued to be possessed by nuclear weapon States. There was therefore a pressing need to achieve an effective arrangement for the security assurances by nuclear weapon States towards non-nuclear weapon States. Although Egypt welcomed unilateral declarations made by some nuclear weapon States that provided security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States, those declarations fell short of Egypt's security requirements and were inadequate. For security assurances to be effective, they must be unconditional, comprehensive, legally binding and negotiated multilaterally. Egypt also had difficulty grasping the argument that security assurances were already being provided to NPT States parties through protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, particularly as the record of signature and ratification of such treaties did not reflect much enthusiasm. Consequently, Egypt believed there was a pressing need to start negotiations on a multilateral and legally binding instrument to provide non-nuclear weapon States with such comprehensive assurances as soon as possible.

CHRISTINA ROCCA (United States) observed that there was an inherent contradiction between the political efforts in the Conference vis-à-vis outer space, as well as the work on mitigation of space debris in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Interagency Space Debris Coordination Committee, on the one hand, and the action taken on 11 January this year. All space-faring nations deserved an explanation for that discrepancy. In that connection, just as the United States reserved the right to protect its infrastructures and resources on land, so, too, did they reserve the right to protect their space assets. It should be emphasized, however, that by maintaining the right of self-defence, the United States was not out to claim space for its own or to weaponize it.

Some had asserted that the recent test of an anti-satellite weapon constituted a further reason to pursue outer space arms control. They had drawn the wrong conclusion. It was regrettable that China had conducted the anti-satellite demonstrations, endangering hundreds of satellites with the resulting debris. It was also regrettable that China continued to call for an arms control arrangement which would not ban its anti-satellite activities nor address the fears that its actions had stoked. The system that was tested by China on 11 January had not been based in space, but had been launched from the ground. Prevention of an arms race in outer space, as they had usually discussed it in the Conference, would therefore not ban such a weapon.
Despite the anti-satellite test, however, the United States continued to believe that there was no arms race in space, and therefore no problem for arms control to solve. Some said that outer space arms control should be extended to ban all anti-satellites, including those terrestrially based, but years of discussions had failed. Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty, drafted almost 40 years ago, encompassed the guiding principles for space operations by which all nations should conduct themselves, including a prohibition on the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and on interfering with the assets of other parties. There were also a number of other conventions, to which the United States was a party, that were designed to provide for cooperation in space and to promote understanding of the responsibilities associated with being a space-faring nation. Negotiating new multilateral agreements were unnecessary and counterproductive. Rather, they should be seeking to gain universal adherence to, and compliance with, existing agreements.

SUMIO TARUI (Japan) said that whether it be "weaponization" or "space objects", the core concepts of prevention of an arms race in outer space were vague and obscure. Due to that vague nature, the ad hoc Committee which between 1985 and 1994 had been tasked with addressing prevention of an arms race in outer space had produced no substantial results, as agreement could not be reached among countries on the definition of "space weapons" or anti-satellites. As the definitions still remained vague, it would be therefore considerably difficult to negotiate a treaty, since it was unclear what obligations would be imposed on the States parties. On the other hand, Japan was confident that under the able guidance of the coordinator for this topic there would be very fruitful discussion this year to overcome those difficulties.

From the perspective of the safe use of outer space and national security, Japan would like to raise its concern in relation to the recent Chinese anti-satellite test. Even though the test brought about the destruction of China's own satellite, that action might also adversely affect the satellites and space activities of other space-faring nations. Consequently, as the facts emerged in due course, that action could be revealed to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Japan requested China to display greater transparency in its outer space activities, as well as its military activities as a whole.

CAROLINE MILLAR (Australia) said Australia firmly believed that all nations should have unhindered access to space for peaceful purposes. Australia expressed concern over China's anti-satellite test of 11 January. It had generated a large amount of debris which threatened other space assets. Australia would like to hear from China, in particular, on any prior analysis they had undertaken on what effect their launch would have on other countries' outer space assets. This was an opportunity for the Conference to clarify certain matters, including confidence-building measures for outer space.

PAUL MEYER (Canada) said that it was incumbent upon them to preserve space for the future of humanity by making effective use of the tools that they had. They also had to continue the ongoing work to develop new tools, which would allow them to better reach the goal of preserving outer space for future generations. Canada was deeply convinced that transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities could contribute to reducing threat perceptions among States. Regulations for space traffic management could be developed through various international pre-notification processes. The adoption of guidelines on reducing the production of space debris, or space debris mitigation, also constituted a particularly useful mechanism. With respect to increasing levels of space debris, the adoption of a multilateral moratorium on all testing of anti-satellite weapons was also an urgent action to be undertaken. The end of anti-satellite weapons tests by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was an excellent example of how voluntary actions by two countries resulted in increased confidence. However, recent events had clearly shown the limits of voluntary measures, taken on an informal basis between two States.

PABLO MACEDO (Mexico), speaking also on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, in their dual capacity as States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and as the Latin American members of the Conference, said that the very existence of nuclear weapons represented a threat to the existence of mankind and the total elimination of such weapons represented the only absolute guarantee against that threat. Until that was done, however, the negotiation of an agreement on negative security assurances had to be pursued. The right which nuclear weapon States presumed to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons was in clear contradiction with the integrity and sustainability of the non-proliferation regime.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones were a contribution to the non-proliferation regime, and the status of such demilitarized zones had to be protected, in particular by nuclear-weapon States, and they should grant assurances to the members of such zones not to use such weapons against them. In that regard, they wished to recall resolution 477, of 8 November 2005, of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which held that the use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack using conventional weapons was not sanctioned by international law, as it represented the use of disproportionate force under article 51 of the UN Charter. For that reason, Mexico would take an active part in discussions on this topic in the Conference on Disarmament.

Right of Reply

SEYED MOHAMMAD KAZEM SAJJADPOUR (Iran), speaking in right of reply, said that Iran categorically rejected what had been said by Israel about his country. It was quite shocking that a country that defied international law in its totality – that rejected General Assembly and Security Council resolutions; that occupied the territories of others; that possessed nuclear weapons and did not join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; that did not approve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; that used cluster bombs against civilians; and that had a long list of other black marks on its report card – had put itself in the position of advising other countries about their security policies. Israel's expansionist, military policy, its nuclear power, and its daily killing of innocent people was indeed a threat to regional peace and stability. Based on a report by two Americans, Israel had also been behind the invasion of Iraq, on a falsified pretext. It was the nuclear weapons of Israel and not the peaceful nuclear programme of Iran, that should be prohibited.

CHENG JINGYE (China), speaking in right of reply, noted that several delegations had mentioned China's test in their statements. China's test had not been targeted against any country, nor did it constitute a threat to any country. China had all along maintained that the Conference should negotiate a comprehensive instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. China had submitted many documents to promote work in that area, including on the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of weapons, and China hoped that the Conference would begin work on such an instrument now. China wished to point out that if members were indeed concerned about enhancing peace and security in outer space they should change their negative attitude about the work taking place in the Conference on the issue and not block its work on this item. Today the United States had said in its statement that it had no claim to reserve space for itself or to weaponize it. Then why was it afraid of negotiating an instrument to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space? It was known that the United States had never stopped research and development for outer space weapons and military doctrines such as "Star Wars" were part of their national policy. The national space policy issued last August referred to by the United States delegation today was nothing more than the declassified version. In the interests of transparency, China would have liked to have had even a brief introduction to the classified one.

The issue of space debris was an old one. Space debris was there before mankind began its exploration of it. China was responsible for only a small portion of that. Of the more than 10,000 pieces of debris in outer space, the United States had had the honour of creating some 41.6 per cent. It was in no position to point its finger at other countries on this issue. Japan had been very interested about the issue of debris as well. China would like to ask if Japan had expressed its concern when its ally had conducted tests before?

Finally, China regretted the disappearance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. China was concerned about the fact that some countries were vigorously developing anti-missile programmes, which, in China's view, were closely linked to the anti-satellite issue.

CHRISTINA ROCCA (United States), speaking in right of reply, wished merely to recommend that colleagues looked closely at the record, because a lot of what the Chinese delegate had said in his speech actually bolstered the United States position.

SUMIO TARUI (Japan), speaking in right of reply, said that, on the issue of space debris created by the United States, the emphasis needed to be on the danger to satellites in orbit brought about the Chinese test, which was a concern of the international community as a whole. He would not go into United States-Japanese relations in the past. On the issue of transparency, Japan valued recent Chinese efforts to make their military activities more transparent and Japan encouraged those. Still, Japan was dissatisfied with the degree of China's military transparency, and requested it to increase that transparency to foster trust between the two countries.

CHENG JINGYE (China), in a second right of reply, reiterated his query as to whether Japan had expressed its concern to the United States on the space debris that that country had created. Regarding transparency, it applied to all countries. It was not right to believe that Japan could not be bound itself by transparency requirements. China performed at least as well as Japan in the field of transparency, not worse, and in many areas it performed better.

SUMIO TARUI (Japan), speaking in a second right of reply, reiterated that he had no exact memory about challenging the United States about creating space debris, but within the discussions in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space he assumed that that issue had come up. Whether Japan had specifically criticized the United States on the subject, he could not say.

For use of the information media; not an official record


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