Green Cross International Forum Expert Meeting

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the Director- General of the United Nations Office in Geneva, Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, allow me to warmly welcome you to the Palais des Nations and to address this distinguished gathering.

As we are rapidly approaching the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention, this roundtable couldn’t have been a more timely opportunity to exchange views on an issue of prime concern to us all.

Natural outbreaks of highly infectious diseases - SARS, Foot and Mouth Disease, Avian Influenza - have had or hold the potential to have devastating consequences on public health, agriculture, the international economy, and national and international security. An outbreak of infectious disease caused by the malicious use of a pathogen or toxin would be equally as damaging as a naturally occurring disease, if not more so.

Biological weapons represent a genuine threat to national and international security. The anthrax attacks of 2001 demonstrated that bioterrorism, in particular, poses a significant threat. The rapid growth of the global biotechnology industry has resulted in the expansion of dual-use materials, technologies, and expertise. Thus, the means to create a deliberate epidemic are much more accessible to a wide range of adversaries, including terrorists.

The ease of transfer of small quantities of agents and immense diversity of potential agents has increased concerns that would-be proliferators could be trying to obtain biological agents for hostile purposes . These concerns have arisen from the potential of biological weapons for inflicting mass panic with relatively limited resources, and that signatures for misuse, or intended misuse, can be hidden easily under the guise of legitimate biotechnological activities. Even if they cause few casualties, the massive humanitarian, psychological and economic impact of biological weapons is inherently attractive to terrorist groups.

Since 2001, many nations have focused on expanding domestic biodefense programs, which aim to improve the ability to detect and respond to a domestic bioterrorist attack. These activities include developing and stockpiling medical countermeasures, improving sensor and detection capabilities, and bolstering the public and agricultural health infrastructure.

Current biological weapons non-proliferation programs generally address the threat of nation states proliferating biological weapons. There is now, however, a critical need for the international community to augment programs that are specifically designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring, developing, and disseminating biological weapons.

This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. Addressing threats posed by the misuse of biological agents requires a concerted response at international, national, facility and individual levels. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system and I will return briefly to this aspect shortly.

The adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties, in particular the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, with the aim of preventing nations from developing, producing, and stockpiling biological weapons represents a major way to address the issue. The absence of effective compliance and verification mechanisms has been the cause of considerable concern in the international community.

The new process for strengthening the BWC, implemented following the Fifth Review Conference of the States parties, presents a greater focus on effective national implementation of the treaty. National measures are also reiterated in the UN Security Council's Resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. This is the first Security Council resolution addressing the threat to international peace and security of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, in particular from non-state actors.

Furthermore, as a follow-up to the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit Heads of State and Government, the Secretary-General - through his May 2006 report “Uniting against terrorism: Recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy” - has submitted a number of proposals to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and enhance coordination of United Nations activities in this regard. These and other proposals have contributed considerably to the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy solidified last September through the related General Assembly Resolution.

Finally, the life-science community in turn can also contribute to reducing the threat of misuse by advocating improved attitudes to biosecurity, identifying security implications of activities, developing a harmonised approach to biosecurity, and promoting these measures with a view to improving security both nationally and internationally.

Your meeting today will be one step forward in the efforts by the international community to enhance human peace and security and I wish you all very fruitful discussions.

Thank you.