CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HEARS FROM EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, TURKEY, PAKISTAN, NEW ZEALAND AND BRAZIL

The Conference on Disarmament this morning concluded its work for the second part of its 2007l session, hearing the President of the Conference, Ambassador Jurg Streuli of Switzerland, present the Presidential report on the work carried out during the second part of the 2007 session. The European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, New Zealand and Brazil also addressed the Conference.

Germany, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said if the Conference did not move forward, this would have a devastating impact on multilateral and bilateral disarmament efforts. The European Union urged the remaining three Member States of the Conference to go along with consensus on the basis of the three documents on the table.

The United Kingdom said a United Kingdom commitment to engage in multilateral negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons had been made. The United Kingdom would clarify, as a nuclear laboratory, and in partnerships with others, the practical steps on the methods to reduce nuclear weapons.

Germany said it was obvious that dependence on assets in outer space was increasing, and therefore increased attention should be paid to this issue. Security in space should be of concern to all in the international community. The complex issue of outer space security showed the need for a comprehensive and holistic solution.

Turkey said kick-starting substantial work on the basis of L.1 and the other documents would constitute only the beginning of a multilateral negotiating process; this process would allow all delegations to voice their concerns and negotiate their alleviations. Moreover, the commencement of this multilateral process would have a knock-on effect on other areas of multilateral affairs.

Pakistan said the four core issues before the Conference could not be evaded, and it was impossible to pick and choose among them: treatment of all issues should be equal, and the Conference had the ability to do this. There should be no insistence on the Conference starting negotiations on one area only, in complete disregard of consensus and the Shannon Mandate. A Fissile Material Treaty should include verification and stocks, including future stocks.

New Zealand said it shared Pakistan’s position that a treaty on fissile material should include stocks and verification, and would enter negotiations with this in mind. To run four contemporaneous negotiations was frankly not practicable, for a range of reasons.

Brazil said it gave a lot of importance to the four core issues, but had always indicated in the Conference that it was flexible on the way to handle these four issues. Brazil was totally in favour of the Shannon Mandate, and wished to see negotiations include verification and stockpiles; however, there should be political flexibility.

The third and last part of the 2007 session of the Conference will be held from 30 July to 14 September.

Statements

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said at the end of the first part of the annual session of the Conference in March, the European Union was encouraged by the constructive, structured and substantive discussions on a high quality level led by the Coordinators during the sessions of the first nine weeks, which were brought about by the six 2007 Presidents’ Organisational Framework. The momentum developed as a result of the initiative taken jointly by the six presidents of the Conference last year had clearly been brought to an even higher level. This had fostered the hope that finally the deadlock in the work of the Conference could be overcome, and significant work resumed. The G8 Summit early this month had expressed strong support for the endeavours underway to overcome the stalemate in the Conference, and reaffirmed its support to the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. This view was fully supported by the European Union.

If the Conference did not move forward, this would have a devastating impact on multilateral and bilateral disarmament efforts. The European Union appreciated the continued support of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference. Under the Presidency of Sweden, two further documents had been issued in a serious, patient and strenuous process to add clarity and to provide answers to questions raised by a few delegations as regarded document L.1. The European Union urged the remaining three Member States of the Conference to go along with consensus on the basis of the three documents on the table.

FIONA PATERSON (United Kingdom) said a major speech had been given by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in Washington at the Carnegie Foundation, with a clear call for the reinvigoration of the collective commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. As all knew, as of yesterday, the United Kingdom had a new Prime Minister, who was creating a new Cabinet. Some believed this speech showed a new policy of the United Kingdom. The ideas expressed in Ms. Beckett’s speech were a logical progression of what the United Kingdom had been saying for some time in different arms control fora. These ideas did not represent a new United Kingdom policy, but were a continuation and a deepening of the overall approach, that there had to be parallel progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A recognition of the bargain between the have and have-nots required those nuclear-endowed States to do more. Those who had not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should do so. There should be further cuts in United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. A United Kingdom commitment to engage in multilateral negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons once this had been done was made. The United Kingdom would clarify, as a nuclear laboratory, and in partnerships with others, the practical steps on the methods to reduce nuclear weapons.

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) said in the context of Germany’s European Union Presidency, it had held workshops recently in Germany with regards to nuclear armaments, including in space. Some elements of the discussions had been summed up by the organisers. It was obvious that dependence on assets in outer space was increasing, and therefore increased attention should be paid to this issue. Security in space should be of concern to all in the international community. Space debris resulted in indiscriminate insecurity. The complex issue of outer space security showed the need for a comprehensive and holistic solution. The same vulnerabilities affected civil and military installations. When addressing space security challenges, it was hard to distinguish between civil and military uses. There was unfortunately a lack of cooperation between the relevant fora, and this should be rectified. Germany would provide these and more relevant inputs once the work in the Conference on Disarmament had progressed in a more substantive manner.

AHMET UZUMCU (Turkey) said as the Conference had reached the end of the second session of the 2007 working year, it had a way forward: a way forward that would mean a historic end to a decade of stagnation and impasse; a way to return to meaningful work; and a chance to build a safer and more secure world through arms control and disarmament. In short, there was no loss for direction that was the product of many months of debate, exchange and elaboration. This product, carefully drafted word by word by the P6, was the Draft Presidential Decision L.1. This proposal, which represented an accurate reflection of where the Conference stood, had been further clarified by the complementary Presidential statement reflecting an understanding of the Conference on the implementation of L.1, and by a draft decision of the Conference. It was hoped that these additional documents would allay the concerns of delegations that had not been able to join the consensus so far.

Kick-starting substantial work on the basis of L.1 and the other documents would constitute only the beginning of a multilateral negotiating process; this process would allow all delegations to voice their concerns and negotiate their alleviations. Moreover, the commencement of this multilateral process would have a knock-on effect on other areas of multilateral affairs. Since this was the closest the Conference had come to consensus for some time, delegations that were awaiting instructions from their capitals should try to speed up their delivery. All decision makers should remember, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had said recently, that finding a fair accommodation now would deprive no Member of the ability to assert its national position in the phases of the Conference’s work to follow the adoption of the Presidential decision.

TEHMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) said the Conference had been considering the Presidential draft decision. A number of States had expressed specific concerns in that regard, and Pakistan had repeatedly identified its difficulties with the text. These were serious concerns of substance that had not been fully addressed. All wanted the Conference on Disarmament to be operational and to fulfil its responsibilities, and be revitalised. The four core issues could not be evaded, and it was impossible to pick and choose among them: treatment of all issues should be equal, and the Conference had the ability to do this. There should be no insistence on the Conference starting negotiations on one area only, in complete disregard of consensus and the Shannon Mandate.

Commitment to nuclear disarmament had been referred to in the Conference, but it did not find adequate reflection in L.1. The world outside awaited agreement in the Conference on starting work towards nuclear disarmament. Pakistan’s concerns were evident in the fact that it required the inclusion of stocks and verification in L.1. A Fissile Material Treaty should include verification and stocks, including future stocks. Pakistan tabled a resolution every year in the United Nations General Assembly to reassure non-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There should be confidence-building measures between nuclear and non-nuclear States. There should be a legally binding international instrument to reassure the latter States from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. L.1 had yet to enjoy consensus - and the security interests of all Member States should be taken into account. Pakistan was committed to working with the President and the Conference to achieve a balanced programme of work.

DON MACKAY (New Zealand) said as the sole negotiating body, and one that had not been negotiating for many years, the issue was to get the Conference to do what it should have been doing. With regards to the issue of stocks and verification and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), New Zealand shared Pakistan’s position that such a treaty should include stocks and verification, and would enter negotiations with this in mind. However, it was not clear whether Pakistan’s objective was to gain acceptance that these issues could be discussed and negotiated during the negotiations on an FMCT, as clearly they could. There was no problem in this area, and it appeared to not be an issue. However, if Pakistan was endeavouring to obtain in advance an outcome on the issue of stocks and negotiation before they had been negotiated, then there was a bigger problem. When starting negotiations, the outcome should not be predetermined in advance, however desirable this may be. It was hoped that it would be possible to obtain clarification in this regard from Pakistan, as this could bring the Conference closer to resolving the issue.

In terms of the issues identified by Pakistan as issues that were important to it, these were also of importance to New Zealand. However, it was not possible to negotiate all of these seriously at the same time. To run four contemporaneous negotiations was frankly not practicable, for a range of reasons. With regards to negative security assurances, there was a potential complication in negotiating these in the Conference, and there was an issue with regards to the potential conferring of the status of nuclear weapon States on all those who possessed or could possess nuclear weapons through entering into negative security assurances. Pakistan should explain what it had done by providing these assurances to other States, as should other States, as this would be useful for the Conference to learn. Work should move forward to allow the Conference to actually do what it should be doing - there should be a balancing of all the issues.

ANTONIO DA ROCHA PARANHOS (Brazil) said Brazil had requested the floor due to the reference made to a Brazilian statement at the General Assembly. Brazil gave a lot of importance to the four core issues, but had always indicated in the Conference that it was flexible on the way to handle these four issues. In 2000, Brazil had presented, as President of the Conference, the text that was known now as the Amorim proposal. In this, there was no reference to a same or equal treatment to the four core issues. This also applied to the revised Five Ambassadors proposal. It had never asked for the immediate negotiation of the four core issues at the same time, as this would cause a serious strain on all delegations.

With regards to the scope of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, Brazil was totally in favour of the Shannon Mandate, and wished to see negotiations include verification and stockpiles. However, there should be political flexibility. After 10 years of no work, the political decision had been made to support L.1, as this was the right way to proceed. This did not prevent substantive discussions, nor the need to find consensus on all four core issues. Invoking the need to begin negotiations in parallel of the four issues was perhaps a way to engage in no negotiations, and this was a source of concern. It was important for the Conference, after so many years of inaction, to firmly show political commitment.

TEHMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) said with regards to inclusion of stocks and verification, Pakistan’s clear concerns about global security implications were evident by the fact that it insisted on the inclusion of these stocks and verification in paragraph 2 of L.1, and believed this was possible as the Shannon Mandate included clear understanding on this issue. With regards to the four core issues, the intention of raising the four was not as Brazil had said, to reflect reluctance to start work, but to indicate that these were also priorities for Pakistan. It did not mean that work could not start on all four issues - Pakistan felt that if work could start then the Conference would be able to reach agreement in some areas, while it could proceed slowly on others. This did not lock the Conference into working at the same speed on all four issues. Pakistan would not impede the work - it merely intended to list its priorities.

JURG STREULI (Switzerland), President of the Conference, said today was the last plenary meeting of the second part of the 2007 session, and there was still one task to accomplish: the Conference had to evaluate the progress accomplished during the second part of the Conference, from 14 May to 29 June, and plan its activities for the next part of the session. Mr. Streuli then read the report.

The report says that by the end of Part I of the 2007 session, a presidential draft decision (CD/2007/L.1) was on the table. During the inter-sessional period between part I and II, the incumbent President conducted consultations based on L.1 with a view to bringing the Conference closer to an agreement on taking up substantive work. At the beginning of Part II, the incumbent President announced that the Presidency would continue consultations with regard to ascertaining the readiness of Member States to move forward towards a decision on L.1. Based on open-ended informal consultations with members of the Conference, a complementary Presidential statement reflecting an understanding of the Conference on the implementation of L.1 was submitted to the Conference. On 21 June 2007, the President tried to establish whether there were any delegations which at that point in time were not in a position to go along with a consensus to begin substantive work on the basis of the three documents taken together. The President concluded that the situation was clear: some capitals needed more time, which should be given. The above has given ground for the assessment that: a momentum has been created to move the Conference on Disarmament out of its longstanding stalemate; a wide range of delegations support the proposal based on the draft mandates contained in L.1 in combination with the other two documents, some would not oppose consensus although they had some concerns, and others needed more time for their capitals to decide whether they could go along with consensus; and there was still valuable time available for the implementation of L.1 if agreed upon, during part III of the current session, and no effort should be spared to adopt a programme of work by consensus. In view of this, the incumbent President will undertake further consultations during the inter-sessional period between parts II and III, based on the three documents with a view to reaching an agreement by the Conference early in the first week of part III of the 2007 session.
Speaking once more to the Conference, Mr. Streuli said that his predecessors had made it clear that L.1, taken together with a schedule of activities, would constitute a programme of work for the 2007 session. L.1 would therefore be reissued for practical reasons and with some small amendments. This was now the end of part II of the 2007 session: this part had moved the Conference significantly forward, but not yet decisively.

For use of the information media; not an official record

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