CONFÉRENCE DE PRESSE DE L'ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA SYRIE, STAFFAN DE MISTURA (en anglais)

SES: Good afternoon and thank you for accepting the short delay, but as Ahmed very clearly mentioned, there have been changes during the whole day in order to make room for other press conferences. Let me make some general comments, or some few specific comments too, actually. And then of course, I’m ready for questions.

I know that you have been expecting this type of opportunity because after the General Assembly and after new developments such as the exodus of refugees and the new acceleration of military activities in Syria, there is a lot to be looking at. But as you can imagine, the Secretary General and myself and my colleagues and my deputy ambassador Ramsey we are following very carefully the situation. But of course there are moments where you don’t talk much, and you try to contribute by being on the issue discreetly.

Anyway, it is some few point I can make, at least at the beginning. The first one, and lets not hide, and it is clear that the Russian military intervention in Syria has indeed introduced new dynamics into the situation. And that means that making forecast speculations are going to be for the moment difficult. That’s one of the reasons why in fact I am on my way tonight to Moscow. There are, however, some firm or at least factual points that one can make.

The first one is that the Security Council Member Countries, such as Russia, or the USA, or France, and other countries have all been asserting that intervening militarily in Syria has been done on the basis of Security Council specific resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. One of them is of course 2170 in particular. I’m sure you are familiar with that one.

Well, the second point I think to be made is that such resolutions, in particular 2170 but there are also two others, all Chapter VII by the way, one 2178 then one 2199, one regarding foreign fighters, terrorist, and the other one about funding. The first one is about actually aiming at stopping terrorism in Syria in particular and elsewhere. Such resolutions are clear and they are being highly negotiated. And therefore, any military intervention is expected to be consistent with them. The third point that I think is factual, that in all cases, protection of civilians should be a priority, especially when the actions are being performed by forces of the Security Council Member. The fourth point which is more enlarged is that, while it is true, and there is no question on that, that fighting terrorist organizations listed by the Security Council resolutions are a priority, it is also true that winning, I repeat winning terrorism can only be achieved through a parallel, I repeat a parallel, all inclusive, transformative political process, within the framework of the Geneva Communiqué.

Only, weapons are not going to be enough. The proof? Well, on the refugee issues: let’s remember that most of the refugees left Syria well before ISIS, Daesh took over almost one-third of the country. In fact they left because of fighting between the Government and what at that time was called mainstream opposition. In other words, if there is not a parallel political process, any type of military action against terrorists by anyone, will not produce what we all want: the stability of Syria.

Now, on the Working Groups because I’m sure that you will be asking me about it and I am following up on that. Just to remind you that on the 29th of July, the Secretary-General and myself proposed avenues to the Security Council. The reason was because the Security Council was, again, still paralyzed on the issue of the so-called transitioning governing body. So, we proposed the working groups to be an instrument, a tool to prepare the ground for a serious discussion between Syrians, among the Syrians, when the sides decide they were ready to sit around the table. And at the same time, the second tool, the second avenue proposed was to start finally having one or two Contact Groups of countries relevant to solving the crises, both in a global way - Russia and the US - regional and beyond. Now these two proposals were launched because there was still a stalemate in the Security Council. And the proposal was approved by Security Council’s press statement on the 17th of August.

And in September, we did our part and we started working, and we also announced the names of the four facilitators and asked everyone to come up with their own lists. The Government has announced their availability and indicated that they have a list of participants ready in all four thematic groups. Some of the opposition groups have indicated their intention to be involved. SOC as you know, yesterday at the general assembly, their own general assembly, decided that they could not be a part of these working groups for the time being, due mainly to the current Russian military activities and some doubts on the outcomes of the Working Groups. My comment to that is that I regret, and however, respect their decisions and hope it can evolve. We’ve had the same similar situation as you remember for the Geneva Consultations. I will now examine what could be our own next steps in order to, however, keep the Working Group’s momentum since there is no alternative but an intra-Syrian dialog in preparation in what one day we hope will be the Geneva III Conference.

That leads me to the next point. In view of the recent developments on the ground it is even more urgent now than before. While before we were thinking that the Working Groups could be a preparatory work, while waiting for the Contact Groups to be established, now it becomes a top priority. Because in view of what is happening on the ground, there is no question that the Working Groups, when they will start working, will have enough energy to be productive, particularly and specially, if by that time the Contact Group of those countries who do have an influence on the conflict would have a started talking and sitting around one table or separate table with the UN supporting it.

Diplomacy, even in the moments of maximum military tension, continues their work. Not by accident you must have seen even meetings in Sochi recently between President Putin and other Saudi and UAE leadership and other meeting taking place in the European environment and so on. The same applies to us. The Secretary-General is constantly consulting everyone who could have an influence and our Deputy-General is currently traveling the region, and my deputy and myself will be traveling to Moscow and then immediately afterwards to Washington.

What we must at all cost avoid at this stage in particular is of course a continuation of the conflict and the increased possibility of reducing violence on the Syrian people and a partition, which is de-facto already being seen as a possibility and we consider that a tragedy. And, at the same time, that the situation could move into a toxic type of cocktail. And, of a combination of a creeping Afghanistan with shades of Libya and Somalia. Hence need of an urgent political process to start now. Conclusion, there is an urgent need to political parallel process. We should be credible, all inclusive, and within the boundaries of the Geneva communiqué. So what can we do meanwhile? All that is what we wish and what we are pushing for and will continue pushing for. Well, the first thing is to avoid that this militarization or acceleration of the militarization of the conflict becomes a dangerous possibility of incident. Therefore, the conflict initiative, especially between Russian and the United States but also neighbouring countries. Second, something we feel very strongly – we have and we should contribute to – is de-escalation. Well, what does this mean? Well it means for instance, that since now, the Syrian authorities do have now through the Russian involvement accurate opportunities to identify what they consider the enemy; there is no excuse, no reason, for the most inaccurate weapons of this conflict: barrel bombs.

The second is just because there is militarization acceleration we should see at least an increase humanitarian access in some gestures of lifting sieges and release of prisoners. This leads me to one specific issue or element that you must have heard about, the so-called Zabadani, Kafraya, Fua initiative.

Zabadani has at the moment 3,000 civilians which should and could be evacuated before is too late. Kafraya and Fua, two villages in the north, Shia villages, also besieged since a long time, have about 10,400 of civilians. The first step where are we working on is expected to arrange for 46 civilians wounded and 46 family members to be evacuated from Zabadani, and at the same time 92 wounded from Kafraya and Fua accompanied by 130 family members, why they are so many? Because there are so many children among them.

The deal has been ready for some time now and it was at the beginning UN-facilitated in a rare serious of meeting between Iran officials and, believe or not, Jaish al-Fatah. Both sides still very much wanted this to go through. The proof is that cease fire which was announced on the 22nd of September is still holding and that the UN family together with their partners, Red Crescent and ICRC are all ready and have been ready for now several days: ambulances, buses, personal employed, in spite of the challenges and the dangers. But in order to carry this humanitarian urgent mission, military activities in the area need to be suspended. I spoke last night with my colleagues in Damascus and the Humanitarian Coordinator, and this morning as well, and we still we like to urge the Government of Syria and the Russian military command to allow this critical mission to go ahead concretely. If the first group is evacuated at the same time, we will be able to arrange for medical supplies through the UN family, ICRC and UNICEF, and basic food for children, and then go to the next steps.

We are not yet there, but we will not give up and I know that my colleagues in Damascus will continue to see alternative route. But just to give you an example on how certain the escalatory issues or initiatives become important, urgent and perhaps even more so during the time of military escalation. There is also another element that you probably are aware of: there is already about 40,000 and increasing numbers of people who are actually adding to the already large number of displaced people inside Syria which have been, according to OCHA, starting moving in view or expectation or fear of further military escalation.

The conclusion we have at the moment is that our job is to mediate and look for any opportunity, even in the worst moment, to see if there is even in any crisis some type of opportunity to reduce the suffering and increase the chances for some serious discussion around the table. As in moments when it looks that the only argument is a military one, we plan together with many others to push for discrete diplomacy and to not stop, and actually accelerate such discrete diplomacy and actively engage all those who are involved or have an influence. There is no sustainable military solution in sight, and I believe and know that this is known by all, including Russians, Americans, Syria and regional players. That is why we are actively involved, although we don’t talk much about it, and this is the first opportunity for me to refer to it.

Q: You said that you were on your way to Moscow; I was wondering what is your message to the Russian leadership and would you urge them to stop the military strikes? Thanks.

SES: I am not going to comment on what would be my message to the Russian leadership, frankly, before going to Moscow. I hope you will understand that. I will be listening to their points and make my own comments. Eventually after the visit I may be able to make some more comments, sorry.

Q: What will you discuss with them and who will you be seeing? And then I have the second question, that have to with, in and one hopes when you the political process going for the political settlement, there was increasing talk about keeping Bashar al-Assad in power at least as a transitional figure. Do you think that this would be at all acceptable to any of the rebel forces that had been fighting him for so many years given the huge death toll and the large displacement? Is this a non-starter?

SES: OK, regarding whom I am meeting and what will be the issues of discussion, well the programme is being well developed while we are talking, so I am not in a position of elaborating, except the fact that it will be more than one meeting. And obviously, my interest would be on what could be the day after this military escalation; in other words, what plans can we develop in order to make sure that, as everybody agrees, there must be a parallel political process. And that leads me to the question you raised: since the parallel political process should be something discussed among the Syrians, and frankly among those who are involved in supporting this conflict, I am not going to elaborate on its outcome or what could be the conditions, and I hope you understand.

Q: Do you think that Russian air strikes would make more and more the people flee the country? Thank you.

SES: I frankly don't know because it depends on the areas and on the reaction by the people. But what I do know, because OCHA had already made a report on it, is that so far around 40,000 people internally were moving away from areas where they expect or they are seeing military acceleration taking place.

Q: The European Union Foreign Minister today said that the Russian airstrikes were a game changer and I was wondering if you feel the same and if you could say more specifically how this is changing your approach?

SES: Well, first of all, I do agree with Federica Mogherini, and that is why I said also in my own statement it is clear that the Russian military, I quote “military intervention has introduced new dynamics in the situation and we need to take those into account so that we can proceed with our own peace mediation. We cannot ignore the fact that there is a new element, and that is obvious. Thank you.

Q: You seem to be saying that the increased military activity intensity demands a quicker political process, but at the same time you are saying that some of the opposition groups are being pushed out. So, some critics would say that the Russians were getting exactly what they want, which is a quicker deal on their terms with some opposition not involved. And you mentioned the Contact Group, or Contact Groups – plural, can you say when those are going to convene and what the timetable is? And on Zabadani, you say that the deal was done with the Iranians, but then you say you turn to the Russians to try to respect it; what interest do the Russians have in respecting the deal that was done by the Iranians?

SES: Well, regarding the last point, the deal was negotiated between the Iranians and one major group of the opposition, and obviously the Russians do have a stake because since the military activities have been accelerated in certain areas where the Russians have been very active, and the Government has been involved too, they do have a saying in terms of reducing those activities while the convoys should took the place. Now, regarding the Working Groups and the current difficulty by some to actually be part of them, I do realize and we all realize that there are moments when we need the dust to be settled, particularly when certain type of new developments are taking place. But there is no question that the Working Groups, which is what the Syrian have always been asking, in other words a possibility of all-inclusive, no one excluded, everyone part of discussions of their own future, need to take place sooner than later.

Now, the only difference between before and now is that we used to see that while waiting for the Contact Groups to be established – or Contact Group and now I will elaborate on that – there was a good opportunity to for preparing the ground by having all those Syrian different groups to sit together, among them, and at least address those non-totally controversial issues such as humanitarian access, such as how to maintain the State institutions and avoid the new Libya, or a new Iraq as it took place when it did. And that has been now into a moment of examination, simply due to the fact that there are new facts on the ground. We intend to pursue that. Now, the Contact Group, or the Contact Groups, well the Contact Groups – why am I saying Contact Groups – because so far it is clear that the first nucleus, core of a Contact Group would the two countries that have been currently discussing, or trying to discuss in the General Assembly the issue of Syria: the United States and Russia. But then, without Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey and other regional players, obviously any Contact Group would not be possible or become productive. So, if some countries don’t want to talk to each other, one could imagine separate Contact Groups that then area facilitated to discuss the through the possibility of the help of the UN or anyone else.

Q: Permit me to be direct in my question. All you have said looks like wishes for the coming period of the crisis in Syria. The reality on the ground is completely different. What we are seeing now is that there is no balance as when you put your plan before; we see stronger Government and weaker opposition. So, for the coming period, how exactly will you move and do you think that this plan is still valid after the new situation on the ground.

SES: Well, the plan is still valid because it is based on the principle that all Syrian entities need to start intra-Syrian discussions sooner or later. And that is unquestionable. They have been themselves saying that there is going to be any political solution without having the Syrians and imposed from abroad. So, when the dust has settled, we will see where we are. I believe that the whole issue of intra-Syrian discussions is still very much on the plan, at the same – no-one can question that – without regional and international support and stimulation, and participation, there would not be sufficient capacity for the intra-Syrian dialogue to become substantial. So the two areas are still on the table.

Q: I was wondering if you could elaborate. You floated the idea of partition and you said that it would be a tragedy. Nevertheless, it was the first time I heard anyone float the idea of partition on the Syrian conflict. Is this getting traction among some of the major powers?

SES: The answer is no, it is not. And I have not been floating the idea; I’ve been expressing one of the worst-case scenarios. Because the Syrians themselves, regardless of where they come from or what their opinion is, they all concur – and we had this during the Geneva Consultations, clearly – about the integrity, unity, sovereignty of one country. In fact, they are very proud of their country. But de facto that could happen, and if the situation is left deteriorating or left as it is.

Q: Chinese Foreign Minister has laid down earlier today three of China’s current positions on the Syrian issue, and one of it is China calls for the Geneva III to be convened at an appropriate time and China emphasized that re-start of the political process does not have any pre-conditions and pre-conclusion and it must be inclusive. What is your position on this, and how far are we in the process?

SES: I can’t tell you. That is where I get into personal difficulties. Personally, all my life I have been like this, I am an optimist and I believe that every crises can offer if properly exploited or worked on, an opportunity for accelerated solution. I don’t know whether what is happening at the moment, not only in Syria but around Syria may produce sufficient critical mass of interest by everyone involved in realizing that there is no military solution, although everyone says so but they still probably don’t believe it. And therefore there would be acceleration for a platform for Geneva III. And, of course, no preconditions are always a very good pattern for starting a discussion and a negotiation. It is a standard, classical approach in order to facilitate a successful negotiation.

Q: You mentioned in the Contact Group’s nucleus Russia and the US, and you mentioned the regional actors. Where would a country like France fall, for instance, a country that is obviously militarily involved, but we hear that some countries that are trying to push France out of those discussions?

SES: I hope you will realize that I will not enter in this type of discussion of who should be in, should be out, and should be part. I think everyone can give his own contribution once the core Contact Group will be established, and everyone realized that they can contribute to serious discussions. Let me not enter into that.

Q: Have you had a clear commitment from Damascus to join those Working Groups; we’re now a week or two since they had been announced. What had happened in the interim?

SES: Well, I was not there because I’d left just the day when he actually made a public statement at the General Assembly. But the Foreign Minister Muallem of Syria said so, publicly, and we got that same message through the Embassy. Therefore, I think it is quite clear: they have made their decision that they are ready to participate to Working Groups, provided that they are not conclusive, or binding, or legally binding and so on. We never wanted that. We always felt those were a preparatory homework in order to facilitate the moment when actually negotiations may start.

Q: When you meet with Russian and US officials, will you discuss when Geneva III would take place and would Geneva talks take place before the end of 2015?

SES: Well, I am just thinking if I can devise a better answer than the one I gave, frankly and probably would be the same as I just gave.

Q: You were talking about the urgency of stopping military action while you have the humanitarian airlift of wounded people out of Zabadani; is this one of the issues that you will be discussing in Moscow?

SES: First of all, let me qualify: it is not an airlift but it is a series of convoys, humanitarian convoys evacuating wounded people from villages and other areas of Zabadani. The issue about de-escalation is certainly going to be discussed by me with anyone related to the Syrian conflict. I would certainly raise this issue as well.

Q: When are you going to Washington and who are you going to meet?

SES: Well, yes, I am going to Washington immediately after Moscow. After all, it makes sense since the two countries have been discussing and need to discuss more about the future steps. In the light of the Russian meetings, I am not going to elaborate at this moment how the programme is being established, but I can confirm it is in the planning.

Q: Coming back to the Contact Group, do you have a vision how you would like to see it operate – we had it during Bosnia peace talks and in the end it got results. What is your vision, would you ideally like one group with the two major powers, and the regional powers in one group, or what?

SES: I am just wondering whether you want me to get into serious trouble or not. Yes, I can see that. Because, as you can remember, every time that you start having this lottery about who is sitting with whom, and who is a part of it, like in Geneva II, then the issue become more about form, and names, and countries, and numbers, than actually about substance. Let’s first start with a first understanding between Russia and the US, which I think is urgent, and the move clearly into the regional context because without – and we learned in Geneva II - without regional involvement in discussions, not only in the conflict, there would be an end to the conflict. At the same time, let’s not be paying lip service to the Syrian people who are the victims of this conflict; it is important that, whatever we want to call them, we call them the Working Groups, there must be an opportunity for an intra-Syrian dialogue, so that whatever discussion among the members of the large, small Contact Group, would not be done over the heads of the Syrians, because it is about their future. And that is why we have a two-pronged approach, which will have ups and downs, depending on circumstances, but the approach is still valid. Thank you very much.