CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HEARS STATEMENTS ON CESSATION OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Conference on Disarmament this morning heard 11 interventions on agenda item 1, cessation of a nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Germany, who spoke on behalf of the European Union, and Japan, stressed the need for further overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. The United States outlined its activities to reduce its nuclear weapons, and to help former Soviet countries to do so, but felt the focus should be on preventing the emergence of new regional nuclear arms races, and to create the environment necessary to complete the process of nuclear disarmament. The burden for eliminating nuclear weapons had fallen for too long on the shoulders of the nuclear weapon States, the United States said. Other speakers, including Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan and Peru, lamented the lack of progress on negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and identifiable way. It was also felt that discrimination and asymmetric possession of weapons of mass destruction undermined non-proliferation and regional and global stability.

All speakers reaffirmed their conviction that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remained the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime, and called for its implementation and universalization. However, a number of speakers regretted that the commitments of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences had mainly not be fulfilled, including to set up a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East and the 13 practical measures to be taken towards nuclear disarmament outlined in the 2000 Review Conference. In addition, there was a need to ensure the NPT guarantees for the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Most speakers attached a clear priority to the negotiation within the Conference of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT), as a means to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation, and felt that among the nuclear issues, an FMCT was the nearest negotiating opportunity and was therefore an opportunity to be seized.

The Conference also agreed to a request by Madagascar to participate in the work of the Conference during 2007 as an observer State.

Speaking this morning was Germany, on behalf of the European Union, the United States, Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Peru, Japan, and the Russian Federation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea spoke in right of reply.

At the end of the meeting, it was announced that Kim Howell, Minister of the United Kingdom for arms control and disarmament issues, would address the Conference at a formal plenary on Thursday, 22 February at 10 a.m.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 13 February.


Statements

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) speaking on behalf of the European Union on the issue of nuclear disarmament, said that non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control remained indispensable elements of cooperative security between States. The European Union stressed the need for an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in particular by those with the largest arsenals, while acknowledging the considerable nuclear arms reductions which had taken place since the end of the Cold War, in particular by two European Union Member States. The European Union noted with concern that serious nuclear proliferation events had occurred in recent years. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which reduced the United States and Russia's strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to 6,000 accountable warheads, was due to expire in 2009. While welcoming the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by Russia and the United States in 2002, the European Union at the same time stressed the need for more progress in reducing their arsenals. The European Union also noted the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. It would welcome a further continuation of both of those processes by, inter alia, a bilateral follow-on agreement of the expiring first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The European Union was also pursuing efforts to secure transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure, to support further progress in disarmament.

The European Union recognized the importance of the programmes for the physical protection of the destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and of fissile material, as defined under the G-8 Global Partnership. It believed the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, were essential for global peace and security, and would continue to work towards universal adherence to the NPT. The European Union also called on all States for universal accession to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Finally, the European Union attached a clear priority to the negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT), as a means to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation, and felt that among the nuclear issues, an FMCT was the nearest negotiating opportunity and was therefore an opportunity to be seized.

CHRISTINA ROCCA (United States) observed that the question before them today was not how to stop a race that for most of them no longer existed, it was how to prevent the emergence of new regional nuclear arms races, and to create the environment necessary to complete the process of nuclear disarmament. For too long, many had taken the easy path of relegating all responsibility in that regard to the nuclear weapon States. That ignored the reality of the world today, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) wisely had made it clear that complete nuclear disarmament was contingent on an improvement in the overall security environment. Every State party to the NPT had a responsible role to play in fulfilling the promise of article VI. Among its objectives and achievements in this area, by 2012, the United States nuclear stockpile would be reduced to nearly a quarter of what it was at the end of the Cold War, and operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads would be reduced to one third of 2001 levels. The Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) had already been completely deactivated, four Trident ballistic missile submarines had been removed from service, and over 1,000 strategic missiles and bombers and 450 ICBM silos had been eliminated. The United States and Russia had agreed on shutting down weapons plutonium production reactors, and the United States had assisted Russia in downsizing and securing its nuclear weapons complex. Indeed, the United States had spent billions of dollars aiding the former Soviet Union States to dismantle their nuclear arsenals. The United States Nuclear Posture Review, which the President approved in 2002, established a blueprint for creating a new strategic triad, that no longer relied solely on nuclear weapons and which would raise the decision threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons continued to have relevance in today's world, but that relevance was clearly not incompatible with the NPT. Indeed, until all countries of the world could create the environment necessary for nuclear weapons to be eliminated – which was the ultimate aspiration of all NPT States parties – the protection which the United States extended to its allies could actually slow nuclear proliferation and help make it less likely that new nuclear arms races would emerge. What was the environment necessary for ongoing reductions to continue to their logical conclusion? Such a security situation included clear and full compliance on the part of all States with their international obligations, in particular under the NPT. It required a world in which the community of nations worked together to ensure that their territories did not provide a safe haven for terrorists. Fundamentally, it was a world in which the lessening of international tension and he strengthening of international trust made it possible for everyone to transcend the competitive military dynamics and concerns that had helped to encourage reliance on nuclear weapons to date. Such circumstances were not easy to achieve, but they were not unimaginable, and the NPT made it clear that all States parties were committed to that ultimate goal.

MOHAMMED LOULICHKI (Morocco) said that Morocco had signed and ratified all the multilateral disarmament treaties and was committed to general and complete disarmament, in particular to verifiable and transparent nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons existed there could be no reliable guarantee of international security or stability. The existence of some 27,000 nuclear weapons worldwide was a threat that could lead to disaster, and the fact that many of them were permanently deployed and on permanent alert increased that risk. Morocco held dear the virtues of dialogue and consultation. Given the present situation, only a step-by-step strategy could lead them to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. To that end, they needed to work for the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the implementation of the NPT. Unfortunately the commitments of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences had mainly not been fulfilled, including setting up a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and the 13 practical measures outlined in the 2000 Review Conference.

The nuclear situation was explosive in some regions. In order to face that international threat, in Morocco's view, international cooperation, political commitment and specific operational activities were essential. For that reason, 13 countries had met in Rabat, Morocco, last October to inaugurate the voluntary Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G-8 initiative put forward by Russia and the United States. Individual and collective efforts undertaken by the international community to combat nuclear terrorism would not be effective, however, unless they became part of a global approach and also addressed root causes, such as poverty and a need to promote a dialogue amongst cultures, including the promotion and protection of human rights. That was what had to be done to ensure that international peace and security was not only preserved, but strengthened. For that reason, Morocco had established a regional policy of cooperation and dialogue.

KHALIL BITAR (Syria) outlined a number of points to bring the Conference out of the impasse in which it had been stuck for many years. First, it was necessary to adopt a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, and to establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate the four core issues: nuclear disarmament, preventing nuclear wars, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances. Secondly, it was necessary to open Conference membership to all UN members. Thirdly, civil society participation in the work of the Conference had to be enhanced, and non-governmental organizations should be able to address the Conference directly.

Syria expressed its deep concern, among other things, at the failure of nuclear weapon States to honour their obligations and to abide by General Assembly resolutions and by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice by commencing negotiation for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and identifiable way. Also, some nuclear weapon States continued to build up their arsenals, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to develop tactical nuclear weapons. Some States had used munitions with depleted uranium in the Balkans, Iraq and Lebanon, and a recent British report had proved the use of enriched uranium by Israel during the war on Lebanon in 2006. Finally, some States concentrated solely on non-proliferation, in a highly selective way, and with a policy of double standards that denied the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The absence of peace and stability in the Middle East, due to Israeli occupation of the Arab territories in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, as well as the Israeli refusal of the Arab Peace initiative, should unequivocally motivate the international community to work, without delay, to free the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction and especially of nuclear weapons. Recently, the Israeli Prime Minister admitted that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. Syria called on the Conference to properly address that threat, to pressurize Israel to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to subject all of its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime. In case of non-compliance, Israel should be subject to international sanctions, according to international law.

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) speaking on behalf of the European Union on the issue of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), said that the European Union was convinced such a treaty would strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and would constitute a significant achievement to nuclear disarmament efforts in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Logically, an FMCT was the next multilateral instrument to be negotiated in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament field. An FMCT would also have additional beneficial consequences, including reducing the risk of theft or diversion to terrorist groups or activities.

The European Union supported the outline for discussions on an FMCT proposed by the Coordinator. In addition, the European Union would like to suggest also treating the issues of review and amendment, and eligibility for signature and arrangements for accession after entry into force. The European Union continued to call for the immediate commencement of negotiations as well as an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, without preconditions. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the European Union called on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for such uses.

SAMEH SHOUKRY (Egypt) stressed that disarmament remained Egypt's top priority in the Conference on Disarmament, and Egypt strongly believed that nuclear disarmament had to remain at the forefront of the Conference's work in its new session. Egypt was extremely disturbed due to the regrettable lack of substantial progress to implement Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which called on States parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. It was lamentable that after 39 years of the NPT's existence, nuclear arsenals remained at levels capable of global annihilation. At the same time, nuclear weapon States continued to advocate their doctrine of nuclear deterrence thereby negating any real intention to strive towards complete nuclear disarmament. The emphasis on arms control and the bilateral efforts, which at the time had been hailed as achievements, could not be regarded as an alternative to the implementation of the commitment contained in Article VI. Moreover, they were feeling the negative effects of attempts by some NPT parties to depart from agreed commitments approved during previous NPT Review Conferences, particularly those made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

The 2000 Review Conference had been a significant milestone in endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. Its final document had established concrete obligations for States parties, including 13 practical steps necessary to implement Article VI of the NPT. Egypt wished to reiterate the centrality of the 13 practical steps, which represented an internationally endorsed road map to fulfil the obligation of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, Egypt placed great importance on the Middle East resolution adopted by consensus in 1995. Since its adoption, however, the international community had not taken any truly active and tangible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel, the first country in the Middle East to initiative an aggressive nuclear programme, remained the sole country in the region that refused to sign the NPT, rejected international inspection of its nuclear facilities, and refused to place those facilities under the full scope of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Egypt would not subscribe to the reverse logic that Israel and its few supporters attempted to propagate: claiming that peace and stability in the Middle East was a prerequisite for tackling the issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

TEHMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) observed that the Conference on Disarmament had been conceived to pursue the disarmament agenda, to avert nuclear war and to seek measures for the security of all peoples. As the objective identified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was general and specified complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, nuclear disarmament should therefore remain the priority issue for the Conference on Disarmament. While some progress had been made, concerns remained, including the impression that, owing to the indefinite extension of the NPT, most nuclear weapon States had presumed a permanent right to retain nuclear weapons; the fact that there were still too many nuclear weapons, with the bulk of them possessed by very few nations; that new and sophisticated devices were being developed; and the increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, which undercut the logic of disarmament.

The Group of 21 had put forward its views, proposing the mechanism for addressing nuclear disarmament in order to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention. In Pakistan's view, the Conference needed to seriously revisit that proposal. In that context, the following considerations needed to be taken into account. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be pursued simultaneously, and not sequentially. The concept of nuclear supremacy and the prominence of nuclear weapons in security doctrines set off a destabilizing chain reaction, and increased the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. Discrimination and asymmetric possession of weapons of mass destruction undermined non-proliferation and regional and global stability. The threat of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction could be addressed through collective and cooperative measures, and specifically through general and complete disarmament. Finally, cooperation in the field of nuclear energy had to continue to get international support under globally agreed conditions. That was part of the NPT bargain.

DIEGO BELEVAN (Peru) said Peru agreed with others on the need to actively pursue nuclear disarmament and was of the view that the incremental approach was the most appropriate solution to restart the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remained the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime. While Peru deeply regretted the fact that the States parties to the NPT had not agreed on a final document at the last review conference, that failure did not in any way undermine the validity of the NPT.

Peru, who was the initiator and negotiator of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, and was a staunch supporter of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means to reduce the possibility that such arms would be used. Peru also reiterated its interest in seeing the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which it hoped would contribute to the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

YOSHINOBU HIRAISHI (Japan) said that the position of the Japanese Government was clearly reflected in its annual sponsorship of the United Nations resolution "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which had been adopted by 167 countries last year. Japan welcomed the steady progress made by Russia and the United States, as well as other nuclear weapon States, to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament, including cuts in types of weapons, as called for in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, greater, tangible efforts to reduce nuclear weapons were needed. Japan urged both Russia and the United States to fully implement the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and to undertake cutbacks, irreversibly and verifiably, beyond those provided for in the Treaty. Diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies was also essential to minimize the risk that those weapons would ever be used, and would facilitate the process of their total elimination.

The NPT had faced a number of serious challenges in recent years, but remained the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Japan strongly urged those countries not party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon States without delay or preconditions. Furthermore, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a crucial step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. With a view towards the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September this year, Japan was maintaining the momentum for the treaty's early entry into force. From the perspective of promoting those aforesaid disarmament efforts, Japan along with the international community strongly condemned the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006.

VALERY LOSHCHININ (Russian Federation), on the topic of nuclear disarmament, affirmed that Russia was true to its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to its bilateral commitments made with the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear war had substantially diminished, and the bilateral nuclear arms race was effectively over. Russia, and everyone, understood that non-proliferation had a big relation to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Ensuring compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime, such as developing a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, could well work to attain the goal of nuclear disarmament. Russia had no preconditions for the negotiation of such a treaty within the Conference.

Of course, things could be impacted by events, such as the growth in financing for military preparations, and the appearance of new military weapons. For example, the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space would have a very destabilizing effect, and would have serious consequences for nuclear disarmament negotiations. The Conference should close existing gaps in international outer space law. They had been told that there were no weapons in space. They had also once been assured that the expansion of NATO to the East would not be accompanied by the transfer of military infrastructure there; the reality had been something different. Regarding the intention of some States to deploy anti-ballistic missiles near Russia's frontiers, President Putin had declared Russia's response would be asymmetrical, but very effective. Of course, Russia would like to prevent any such occurrence, but the responsibility did not lay with them.

Right of Reply

HAN SUNG IL (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), responding to Japan's statement regarding nuclear tests, said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was fully committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as they had many times reiterated in the past. It was, however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's sovereign right to conduct nuclear tests. It was not a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It had not been the choice of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to do that. It had been forced to withdraw from the NPT when it had tested the weapon, because of the growing threat of a nuclear power against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea wished to assure Japan that its nuclear weapons did not threaten other countries, including Japan. Such weapons were only a deterrent against attack by nuclear weapon States in the future. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was for its part committed to do its best to work towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world.